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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Manuscript type:  
Empirical 
 
Research Question/Issue:  
This study investigates to what extent regulation encourages private shareholder engagement 
attitudes and behaviour (including behind-the-scenes consultations, letters, meetings and 
ongoing dialogues) of pension funds and asset managers with listed investee companies on 
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues in Brazil and South Africa. 
 
Research Findings/Insights:  
Drawing on 44 in-depth semi-structured interviews with pension fund representatives, asset 
managers and other investment players, the findings suggest that legislation provides limited 
direct encouragement to private engagement behaviour. However, legislation encourages 
attitudes towards Responsible Investment by enhancing investor understanding of 
Responsible Investment, increasing the interest of pension funds and asset consultants in the 
Responsible Investment practices of asset managers, and reducing the fear of pension funds 
to violate their fiduciary duties, thereby promoting an enabling environment for ESG 
engagement. 
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications:  
This article adds to the literature on comparative corporate governance and shareholder 
engagement. To the best of our knowledge, this is first study that specifically analyses how 
regulation affects private shareholder engagement behaviour in emerging markets, providing 
empirical support for the institutional perspective. The findings also suggest that the 
sophistication of the legislation on ESG issues in Brazil and South Africa is more typical of 
developed countries, indicating the need for a more fine-grained analysis of emerging 
markets in corporate governance studies. 
 
Practitioner/Policy Implications:  
This study draws investors’ attention to the importance of understanding the national legal 
environment of the companies with which they engage and offers insights to governments 
interested in fostering ESG engagement practices. 
 
Keywords:  
Corporate Governance, Emerging Markets, Institutional Theory, Responsible Investment, 
Shareholder Engagement 
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Institutional Determinants of Private Shareholder Engagement in 
Brazil and South Africa: The Role of Regulation 
By Camila Yamahaki and Jędrzej George Frynas 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been a significant growth of Responsible Investment in emerging markets as 
institutional investors increasingly take into consideration environmental, social and 
corporate governance (ESG) issues in their investment decision-making. In Asian emerging 
markets, assets adopting Responsible Investment strategies amounted to around US$ 45 
billion in 2013 (ASrIA, 2014). In Sub-Saharan Africa, an estimated US$ 125 billion were 
invested using Responsible Investment principles in 2010 (IFC, Sinco & Riscura, 2011) and, 
in Brazil, an estimated US$ 40 billion employed a Responsible Investment approach in 2009 
(IFC & Teri, 2009). The practice of shareholder engagement, a strategy for Responsible 
Investment (Goodman, Louche, van Cranenburgh & Arenas, 2014), has also gained 
prominence in these markets, as shown by the advances promoted by the Emerging Markets 
Disclosure Project, championing engagement with over 100 companies in Brazil, Indonesia, 
South Africa and South Korea for greater corporate transparency with the support of 55 local 
and foreign investors (USSIF, 2012). 
  Shareholder engagement (or shareholder activism) is one of the strategies available to 
investors seeking to adopt a Responsible Investment approach (for a recent review of the 
shareholder engagement literature, see Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Shareholder engagement is 
defined as “actions taken by shareholders with the explicit intention of influencing 
corporations’ policies and practices” (Goranova & Ryan, 2014: 1232). Shareholder 
engagement may be classified into routine and extraordinary engagement. While routine 
engagement includes regular one-to-one meetings with corporate management and the 
exercise of voting rights, extraordinary engagement may include letter writing to senior 
management, the submission of shareholder resolutions, the request of extraordinary general 
meetings (EGMs) and joint institutional investor engagement (Martin, Casson & Nisar, 
2007). Shareholder engagement has also recently been categorised according to pathways of 
owner behaviour (McNulty & Nordberg, forthcoming). Whilst path (a) relates to shareholder 
engagement that is primarily self-interested, may be financially or ideologically motivated, 
has short-term objectives and involves engagement forms that reach public attention (e.g. 
voting or shareholder resolutions), path (b) involves the accommodation of plural actors and 
active engagement between shareholders and managers through private dialogue often over a 
considerable time. Most pertinent to this paper, shareholder engagement has typically been 
categorised according to the level of engagement privacy as investors can engage with 
companies using public forms of engagement, such as the filing of shareholder resolutions, 
the exercise of voting rights and media campaigns, or adopting more private engagement 
strategies, including private negotiations, behind-the-scenes consultations, letters, phone 
calls, meetings, and ongoing dialogues (Clark & Hebb, 2004; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; 
Rehbein, Logston & Van Buren III, 2013). Following this classification, private engagements 
will be the focus of our investigation in this paper.  
  Our study specifically examines the influence of formal institutions on private shareholder 
engagement in emerging markets. Following North (1990), formal institutions include 
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constitutions, laws, policies and formal agreements - as opposed to informal rules like norms 
of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct. A study of this topic is 
important because formal institutional changes can reportedly stimulate shareholder 
engagement (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008) and foster different engagement strategies (Mallin, 
2011). Conversely, questioning from shareholders can encourage the regulator to change 
legislation related to shareholder engagement (Dhir, 2006; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). 
Nonetheless, while there is some empirical and anecdotal evidence that legislation influences 
shareholder engagement, the relationship between formal institutions and private engagement 
remains largely under-researched (a notable exception includes Chow, 2010), in particular, 
there are no studies that specifically analyse the impact of regulations on private shareholder 
engagement performed by institutional investors with listed companies in emerging markets. 
On the one hand, some scholars have pointed to the difficulty in obtaining data that measures 
private engagement, as dialogue between investors and companies takes place ‘behind-the-
scenes’ and without public knowledge (e.g. Amalric, 2004; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Rehbein et 
al., 2013). On the other hand, scholars have largely portrayed formal institutions in emerging 
and developing markets as underdeveloped in terms of the level of sophistication of relevant 
social and environmental regulation and in terms of the lack of legal enforcement (Estrin & 
Prevezer, 2011; Tan, 2009; Dentchev, van Balen & Haezendonck, 2015), suggesting that 
formal institutions do not play an important role as drivers of private shareholder engagement 
in these markets (Sjöström & Welford, 2009). In sum, there is a literature gap with regards to 
the influence of formal institutions on private shareholder engagement in emerging markets. 
  Hoping to fill this literature gap, this study investigates whether and how regulations affect 
the attitudes and behaviour of institutional investors with regards to private shareholder 
engagement. Brazil and South Africa were chosen for our enquiry given the growing interest 
in Responsible Investment and shareholder engagement by institutional investors in these 
countries. Brazil and South Africa feature the largest number of emerging market signatories 
to the United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) (PRI, 2015a) 
and they reported to have conducted the largest number of extensive engagement among 
emerging markets (PRI, 2010). While institutional investors may include pension funds, 
insurance companies, unit trusts, open-ended investment companies, investment trusts in the 
UK and mutual funds in the US, hedge funds and private equity funds (as defined by Martin 
et al., 2007), our paper focuses specifically on pension funds and asset managers since we 
concentrate on investigating the main types of institutional investors engaging with listed 
companies in these two markets (as the characteristics of the institutional investors involved 
in the Emerging Markets Disclosure Project demonstrate). Therefore, the question arises as to 
what drives shareholder engagement behaviour in countries such as South Africa and Brazil. 
  This study’s findings suggest that legislation provides limited direct encouragement to 
private engagement behaviour performed by pension funds and asset managers with listed 
companies in these two countries. However, there is evidence that legislation positively 
encourages Responsible Investment by enhancing investor understanding of Responsible 
Investment, increasing the interest of pension funds and asset consultants with regards to the 
Responsible Investment practices of asset managers, and reducing the fear of pension funds 
to violate fiduciary duties, thus promoting an enabling environment for ESG engagement. 
  This article adds to the stream of literature on comparative corporate governance and, 
particularly, to the literature on shareholder engagement which is focused on Anglo-Saxon 
countries and lacks a more international perspective (Bauer, Clark & Viehs, 2013; Gifford, 
2008; Sjöström, 2008). To our knowledge, this is the first study to specifically analyse how 
formal institutions affect the attitudes and behaviour of pension funds and asset managers 
with respect to private engagement with investee companies on ESG issues in the context of 
emerging markets, providing empirical support for the institutional perspective. The findings 
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also suggest that the sophistication of the legislation on ESG issues in Brazil and South 
Africa is more typical of developed countries, indicating the need for a more fine-grained 
analysis of emerging markets in corporate governance studies. 
  The structure of this paper is as follows. The first section reviews the existing literature 
relating to private shareholder engagement on ESG issues. We then discuss the role of formal 
institutions with reference to encouraging responsible behaviour. Next, we briefly discuss the 
institutional contexts in Brazil and South Africa. Following a discussion of the research 
design and methods, we present and discuss the results drawing on 44 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with pension fund representatives, asset managers and other investment 
players. Finally, we conclude by considering the theoretical and practical contributions of this 
study and we highlight avenues for future research. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Private Shareholder Engagement 
 
Previous research on private shareholder engagement has been hindered by a lack of data 
given the very nature of engagement in which dialogues between corporate managers and 
shareholders occur behind the scenes and out of sight from media scrutiny (Logsdon & Van 
Buren III, 2009; Rehbein et al., 2013). Despite difficulties in data collection, there has been 
an increase in scholarship on this topic. An important stream of research focuses on the 
influence of shareholder engagement on financial performance. Smith (1996), Strickland, 
Wiles and Zenner (1996) and Wahal (1996) report positive financial announcement returns in 
the samples involving private negotiations. Smith (1996) analysed the engagement efforts of 
the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) in changing the governance 
structure of target companies, noting that, when successful, engagement resulted in a 
statistically significant increase in shareholder wealth. Likewise, Becht, Franks, Mayer and 
Rossi (2009) and Nesbitt (1994) observe that engaging with focus lists of underperforming 
companies leads to enhanced financial returns. For instance, Becht et al. (2009) found that 
Hermes’ UK Focus Fund outperformed benchmarks and that the abnormal returns generated 
by the Fund are largely associated with its engagement practices rather than stock picking. 
  Another stream of research on private engagement is concerned with the factors that 
contribute to the effectiveness of shareholder engagement towards improving ESG 
performance of target companies. Gifford (2008; 2010) adopted Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s 
(1997) model of stakeholder salience to analyse the factors that enhance shareholder salience 
in improving corporate performance, concluding that the legitimacy of the investor and 
urgency-related factors, measured by the degree of assertiveness and persistence of the 
investor, contribute to an effective engagement. Other researchers (e.g. Gond & Piani, 2013; 
Hebb, Hachigian and Allen, 2015) also applied Gifford’s (2008; 2010) framework to 
investigate engagement success. Examining collaborative engagements, Gond and Piani 
(2013) observe that company managers perceive that collaboration increases the degree of 
power, legitimacy and urgency of the investor group, and that investors manage these 
attributes to reshape the legitimacy and urgency of their claims in the eyes of managers. 
Investigating the perspective of the investee companies, Hebb, Hachigian and Allen (2015) 
found that target companies consider the persistence of the engager and his knowledge of the 
investee companies to be important elements for a successful engagement, while the 
attributes of power and the time-sensitivity factor of urgency were not raised as drivers of 
engagement saliency. Bauer et al. (2013) found that geography is another important 
determinant of engagement success. Studying the engagement activities of one particular UK 
 6 
 
asset manager, they noted that this institutional investor is more likely to achieve engagement 
success with firms from the US and Continental Europe than with the UK firms, which they 
attribute to the fact that the investor selects more carefully firms abroad for which the 
expected success likelihood is highest.  
  A third stream of research on private engagement deals with the factors that encourage or 
limit institutional investors to engage with companies on ESG issues (e.g. Clark & Hebb, 
2004; Tilba & McNulty, 2013; Kolstad, 2016). Tilba and McNulty (2013), for example, argue 
that higher pension fund engagement is explained by a number of investor-level factors, such 
as the presence of pension fund internal resources underpinning in-house investment 
management, large ownership stakes in corporations and a pension fund ethos of responsible 
ownership. Clark and Hebb (2004) note that the increasing awareness of pension funds 
regarding the positive impact of ESG issues on long-term value also encourages investor 
engagement. On the other hand, Tilba & McNulty (2013) claim that the lack of investment 
expertise of pension fund trustees and their reliance on external service providers act as 
barriers for engagement. Since most trustees lack investment skills (see Kakabadse 
Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2003; Myners, 2001), they rely on the advice of investment 
consultants who then incentivise pension funds to focus on short-term financial performance. 
As a result, pension funds encourage their asset managers to pursue short-term returns (e.g. 
by evaluating fund managers on a quarterly basis and by offering them short-term rewards) 
rather than incentivising responsible ownership behaviour.  
  Despite the above advances in our knowledge of shareholder engagement, Goranova and 
Ryan (2014) suggested that the shareholder engagement field has largely neglected the 
institutional perspective, paying little attention to the distinct institutional environments in 
which firms operate, and that research could benefit from a more contextualised approach 
that considers environmental factors. A small number of studies from an institutional theory 
perspective have outlined how both pressures from social movements (Rao & Sivakumar, 
1999; Reid & Toffel, 2009) and enabling institutional frameworks such as the PRI and the 
Investor Research Responsibility Center (Gond & Piani, 2013; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006) can 
stimulate shareholder engagement. Given that recent institutional scholarship points to 
government regulation as the arguably greatest source of isomorphic pressures for “voluntary” 
social and environmental practices (Gond, Kang & Moon, 2014; Knudsen, Moon & Slager, 
2015), institutional theory directs our attention to the potential key role of legislation in terms 
of encouraging shareholder engagement. 
 
The role of legislation in responsible behaviour 
 
The body of academic research finds that legislation and the legal systems are important 
factors influencing corporate governance (e.g. Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Chizema & 
Buck 2006; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; La Porta, Lopez, Schleifer & Vishny, 1998). 
Legislation can also encourage more responsible behaviour on the part of firms (Campbell, 
2007; Chih, Chih & Chen, 2010; Knudsen et al., 2015) and investors (e.g. Bengtsson, 2008; 
Juravle & Lewis, 2009; Sievanen, Scholtens & Rita, 2011). Campbell (2007) argues that 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviour is associated with the level of state and 
industry regulation, enforcement by state agencies, and legal institutions that facilitate 
dialogue between companies and their stakeholders. In line with these institutional theory 
predictions, recent CSR scholarship provides mounting evidence that governments in 
emerging markets such as China, India and Indonesia have made forays into the formal 
regulation of CSR standards, sustainability reporting and responsible investor behaviour 
(Kumar, 2014; Marquis & Qian, 2014; Waagstein, 2011). 
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  In terms of investor behaviour, Bengtsson (2008) and Juravle and Lewis (2009) found that 
legislation requiring pension funds to include ESG issues in their investment policies boosted 
the development of Responsible Investment in the UK and in Scandinavia. The academic 
literature has also investigated the relationship between legal fiduciary duties and 
Responsible Investment given the controversy with regard to whether taking ESG factors into 
account is legally permitted for institutional investors. On the one hand, authors with a 
traditional view of fiduciary duties such as Langbein and Posner (1980: 98) argue that the 
duty of prudence “reinforces the duty of loyalty in forbidding the trustee to invest for any 
object other than the highest return consistent with the preferred level of portfolio risk”. As 
stated by Sandberg (2013), this is often understood as prohibiting trustees to consider various 
non-financial issues into investment decisions. On the other hand, a report commissioned by 
the United Nations Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) to the law firm 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (known as the ‘Freshfields Report’) concludes that 
integrating social and environmental issues is possible and mandatory when such issues are 
financially relevant and when they are supported unanimously by the beneficiaries 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005), while legislative reforms in a number of 
jurisdictions such as Manitoba in Canada (Manitoba, 2014) either expanded or clarified the 
notion of fiduciary duties by explicitly allowing trustees to consider non-financial issues 
(Richardson, 2008). Hence, the discussion as to whether fiduciary duties allow the adoption 
of Responsible Investment is ongoing. 
  Previous studies have also acknowledged that regulatory changes can encourage more 
collaborative shareholder engagement - notably, in 1992, the amendments to the federal 
proxy regulations of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allowed investors to 
communicate and coordinate with other investors, making it easier for shareholders to form 
coalitions (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008; Choi, 2000). Legislation can also foster particular 
engagement strategies over others – e.g. voting turnout is higher in the US because private 
pension funds are mandated to vote by the Department of Labour’s regulations governing 
proxy voting (Mallin, 2011). Furthermore, questioning from investors can incentivise 
regulatory bodies to change shareholder engagement legislation. For example, in 1976, the 
SEC revised Rule 14a-8 allowing the submission of resolutions on social issues after a group 
of investors sued the SEC for allowing Dow Chemical to exclude the group’s proposal which 
recommended that the firm discontinues the manufacturing and selling of napalm (Dhir, 
2006; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). As the above studies demonstrate, the academic literature has 
analysed the relationship between legislation and responsible behaviour, including more 
public forms of shareholder engagement, while, to our knowledge, this is the first to 
specifically investigate the impact of regulations on private shareholder engagement in 
emerging markets. 
  In developing/emerging countries, the legal environment is typically portrayed in the 
literature as being characterised by a lack of regulation and/or legal enforcement (Estrin & 
Prevezer, 2011; Tan, 2009; Dentchev et al., 2015). In the sphere of environmental concerns, 
studies report that regulation on these issues is looser and less likely to be enforced by 
governmental agencies in developing countries (Kusku & Zarkada-Fraser, 2004; Lang & Ho, 
2000). Moreover, Estrin and Prevezer (2011) observe that BRIC countries either have an 
ineffective legal system with weak contract enforcement (e.g. China) or a well-established 
legal framework with a low level of implementation (e.g. India).  
  A number of researchers claim that developing countries keep social and environmental 
standards and the correspondent level of enforcement low for reasons such as the lack of 
resources and staff for effective enforcement (Nielsen, 2005), or in order to attract and 
maintain foreign investment (Mwaura, 2005) and to promote economic development (Arnold, 
2010). Mwaura (2005) argues that the Kenyan government has been reluctant to impose 
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stringent human rights regulations on the premise that companies would relocate to other 
countries or would be reluctant to enter the Kenyan market. In Bangladesh, Nielsen (2005) 
notes that the national laws banning child labour were not enforced because the Bangladesh 
Department of Labour and Inspectorate lacked sufficient resources, staff and logistical 
support to adequately monitor child labour laws. Moreover, the low level of societal 
expectations in developing countries does not compel local governments to effectively 
regulate (Ozen & Kusku, 2009). On investor behaviour, Sjöström and Welford (2009) 
observe that the drivers of Responsible Investment that exist in developed countries such as 
regulation do not exist in the context of emerging markets such as Hong Kong. To sum up, 
while previous studies have not investigated the regulatory antecedents of shareholder 
engagement in emerging markets, the extant literature makes an assumption that the legal 
framework in emerging markets is generally weak or not well-enforced and, as such, does not 
have the power to encourage responsible practices such as shareholder engagement. 
 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT – BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Brazil 
 
Brazil has a thriving capital market and the world’s twentieth largest stock exchange 
(BM&FBovespa), accounting for US$ 519 billion in market capitalisation and featuring 357 
domestic and foreign listed companies as of November 2015 (WFE, 2015). Ownership is 
highly concentrated as 74% of publicly traded companies have a controlling shareholder 
(CFA Institute, 2009). Most Brazilian companies are controlled by families (Aguilera, 2009) 
and a few large public pension funds are significant shareholders in many Brazilian 
companies. For instance, PREVI, the largest pension fund in the country managing US$ 74 
billion, or 26% of the total pension fund assets (ABRAPP, 2014), holds 10.4% of shares at 
Banco do Brasil (Banco do Brasil, 2014), 12.26% at BRF (BRF, 2013) and 30% at CPFL 
(CPFL, 2014). Petros, the second largest public pension fund managing nearly US$ 29 billion 
(ABRAPP, 2014), holds 10% of shares at DASA (DASA, 2014), 12.1% at BRF (BRF, 2013) 
and 24.45% at Lupatech (Lupatech, 2014). 
  Brazil’s legal system is based on French civil law, arguably offering the lowest level of 
investor protection compared to other legal systems (La Porta et al. 1998). Legislation allows 
controlling shareholders to retain substantial influence on investee firms. As the law allows to 
issue shares without voting rights up to two-thirds of capital stock (Institute of Directors, 
2005) and 50% for new listed companies (Da Silva, 2002), it is common for insiders to retain 
voting shares and to issue non-voting shares to outsiders (Black, de Carvalho & Gorga, 
2010). Controlling shareholders also have the right to elect Board members in proportion to 
their shareholdings (CFA Institute, 2009), gaining substantial influence in the strategic 
decision of investee companies. A Booz Allen and IBGC (2009) survey suggests that 
controlling shareholders are largely represented in companies’ Boards: on average, 30% of 
board members are non-executive directors representing large and controlling shareholders. 
  Given the large influence of controlling shareholders in Brazil, national legislation provides 
a number of rights to protect minority shareholders. The Companies Law allows non-voting 
shareholders representing at least 10% of the share capital, and minority voting shareholders 
owning at least 15% of the voting shares, to elect one Board member each. The law also 
gives the option for shareholders representing at least 10% of the share capital with voting 
rights to adopt the cumulative voting system. In this case, for each share the shareholder 
owns, he can vote as many times as there are seats on the Board, increasing his chances to 
elect a representative. Further, voting shareholders who own 10% of the voting share capital, 
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and the group of non-voting shareholders, may elect one Fiscal Council member each. 
Previous studies indicate that minority rights have been increasingly employed by smaller 
shareholders: in 1999, Saito and Dutra (2006) found that the majority of Brazilian minority 
investors were not using the mechanisms provided by the legislation to elect directors onto 
Boards of Directors, while, in 2005, Black et al. (2010) found that 41% of the 116 Brazilian 
firms they surveyed had one or more representatives of the minority shareholders. 
  Encouraging investors to consider ESG issues, the National Monetary Council issued 
Resolution 3792 in 2009 requiring all Brazilian pension funds to make it explicit in their 
investment policy whether they consider social and environmental issues in their investment 
decisions. Although integrating ESG issues was not made mandatory, this piece of legislation 
brought the topics of Responsible Investment and sustainability to the forefront of discussions 
in the pension fund industry. A study by Previ (2011) found that 44% of the 50 largest 
pension funds included social and environmental criteria in their investment policies. The 
impact of this regulation on Responsible Investment and on shareholder engagement has been 
further examined in the present study. 
 
South Africa 
 
South Africa has the seventeenth largest stock exchange in the world, the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE), accounting for nearly US$ 790 billion and 382 domestic and foreign listed 
companies as of November 2015 (WFE, 2015). Shareholder ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of a number of founding families of large companies (Okeahalam, 2004). In addition, 
the South African government holds significant ownership stakes in large public and private 
companies through the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) (Ntim, Opong & Danbolt, 2012), 
the asset manager of the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), the largest pension 
fund in the country, and in the whole of Africa (IFC et al., 2011). 
  The South African legal system is based on the common law system, known to offer the 
highest level of legal investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998). The institutional structures 
and shareholder rights in South Africa tend to be strong in comparison with rights in other 
emerging markets (Andreasson, 2011; CFA Institute, 2009) and, overall, South Africa is rated 
among the best performers in corporate governance in these nations (IoDSA, 2009; Judin, 
2003 cited in Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). Past history of poor corporate governance practices and 
the consequent undermining of local and foreign investment in South African corporations 
were partially responsible for the increase in corporate governance standards in the country 
and for the development of the King Report (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). Created 
in 1994 and now in its third version, the King Report offers improved standards of corporate 
governance (Andreasson, 2011). Although the King Report has no force of law, in 1995, the 
JSE made it compulsory for listed companies to disclose the extent of their compliance with 
it or explain their lack of compliance (Malherbe & Segal, 2001 cited in Vaughn & Ryan, 
2006), leveraging the report’s application. 
  The pension fund industry is highly concentrated in South Africa. While there are 
approximately 14,000 pension funds in the country representing US$ 250 billion in assets 
under management (IFC et al., 2011), the GEPF is worth nearly US$ 94.5 billion (GEPF, 
2014). Private pension funds invest the majority of their assets domestically given a limit to 
foreign investment specified in the Pension Funds Act. According to the regulation, pension 
funds are allowed to invest up to 20% of the total value of the assets in investments outside of 
South Africa, and thresholds vary according to asset class (OECD, 2011). 
  South African legislation has been greatly influenced by the country’s historical and social 
conditions, and the South African government has gone much further than governments in 
many other countries to legislate social issues in company’s management (Hamann, 2008). 
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After the end of Apartheid, the government sought to develop a number of regulations to 
reduce social inequality in the country, including the Employment Equity Act and the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (West, 2006). Regulations encouraging 
consideration of ESG issues by investors were also developed. Effective since 1 January 
2012, the preamble of Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act states that “prudent investing 
should give appropriate consideration of any factor which may materially affect the 
sustainable long-term performance of a fund’s assets, including factors of an environmental, 
social and governance character” (Republic of South Africa, 2011). WWF (2013) argues 
that, although it is too early to assess the impact of the Regulation, a study conducted by 
SinCo (WWF, 2012) indicates that Regulation 28 has been a powerful driver for increased 
ESG integration. The outcomes of Regulation 28 on Responsible Investment and on 
shareholder engagement have been further analysed in the present study. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
Sampling 
 
The selection of the participating organisations was based on critical cases (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Due to the reduced number of cases that can be studied, it is suitable to select extreme 
situations in which the process of interest is more transparently observable (Pettigrew, 1990). 
In this study, cases were considered critical when they involved pension funds or asset 
managers who demonstrated some commitment to Responsible Investment (by being 
signatories to the UN-supported PRI) and/or shareholder engagement activities (by having 
regular engagement activities or by being known to be shareholder activists), or interest 
groups who work closely with investors on ESG issues (e.g. academics, investor associations 
etc., henceforth called “non-investors”). Therefore, the PRI signatory list formed the basis for 
selecting critical cases. Access to the interviewees was facilitated by the fact that one of the 
authors was working with the PRI Investor Engagements team in 2011 when participant 
recruitment was taking place. Given that she was working closely with the PRI Brazilian 
signatories (helping to coordinate one of the collaborative engagements in Brazil) and that 
she was able to identify and reach out to all of the key South African investors or investment 
service providers, it was possible to recruit most potential participants from within PRI 
signatories. Potential interviewees were either contacted directly by the authors or were 
personally referred to by previously selected interviewees. In total, 44 organisations 
participated in this study. 20 participants were interviewed in Brazil (13 investors, seven 
“non-investors”) and 24 were interviewed in South Africa (12 investors, 12 “non-investors”).  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
  As mentioned earlier, the institutional investors examined were pension funds and asset 
managers as they were found to be the main institutional investors engaging with listed 
companies in these two markets. In Brazil, out of the 13 investors, six pension funds and 
seven asset managers participated, representing assets under management ranging from US$ 
200 million to US$ 91 billion in assets. In South Africa, three pension funds and nine asset 
managers were interviewed, representing assets under management ranging from US$ 527 
million to US$ 138 billion. A combination of small and large investors, corporate and non-
corporate pension funds, and independent and non-independent asset managers were included 
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in the sample (for reasons of confidentiality, the number of investors interviewed according 
to these sub-categories were not disclosed). A reduced number of South African pension 
funds were interviewed because of the limited number of pension funds who are signatories 
to the PRI (only four pension funds in South Africa were signatories when data was collected 
in 2012), suggesting that there is limited interest in Responsible Investment among asset 
owners in the country. All of the participating investors were PRI signatories, except for one 
Brazilian and one South African investor, who were selected based on their reputation as 
activists on corporate governance issues. The investor representatives interviewed were heads 
of research, investment/portfolio managers or investment/ESG analysts.  
  The interviewed “non-investors” were selected based on their knowledge and experience of 
working closely with investors on Responsible Investment. They comprised a mix of 
academics, industry/investor association representatives, asset consultants and independent 
activists. Asset consultants were not interviewed in Brazil because, according to the 
interviewees, consultants are not commonly employed by pension funds for the selection of 
asset managers as they are in South Africa. 
 
Data collection 
 
This study employed semi-structured interviews as they allow cross-case comparability and 
permit a fairly clear focus, while providing the flexibility to accommodate other areas of 
interest which arise during the interview (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Moreover, this method was 
selected given the nature of private engagements, which are conducted ‘behind closed doors’ 
and on which there is a lack of public data, a constraint to researching this topic in contrast 
with more public forms of engagement (Amalric 2004; Gillan & Starks, 2003). 
  Before the main data was collected, a pilot study was held in 2011 by telephone to examine 
whether the interview guide succeeded in investigating the research objectives. In total, eight 
investors were interviewed from each country. After the pilot study, the two foreign investors 
were excluded as the research focus was refined to study the perceptions of local investors. 
  The main data collection took place between June 2012 and September 2012. We travelled 
to Brazil and South Africa to interview the participants as preference was given to face-to-
face interviews in the interviewees’ offices to enable interviewer and participant to build a 
rapport (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). Before the interviews, we collected secondary data from 
corporate documents (e.g. investors’ websites, annual and sustainability reports, investment 
policies) in order to avoid asking questions about issues for which information was public. 
  To prevent participants from drawing on their own idiosyncratic understandings of what 
shareholder engagement entails, we provided a definition of the term “private shareholder 
engagement” at the beginning of the interview to explain and emphasise that the focus of the 
study was on direct, private negotiations between institutional investors and listed companies 
on ESG issues, hence, excluding more public forms of engagement, such as the filing of 
shareholder resolutions and voting. As Brannen (2005) and Hurmerinta-Peltomaki & 
Nummela (2006) point out, in cross-national studies, it is important that the researcher 
confirms that all respondents understand the concepts in a similar way.  
  The interviewees were asked about (i) their position and main responsibilities within the 
organisation; (ii) how they perceived the state of Responsible Investment and shareholder 
engagement in their countries; (iii) their own Responsible Investment and private shareholder 
engagement practices (in the case of investors); and (iv) to what extent they believed that 
legislation encouraged shareholder engagement behaviour in the country. Drawing on our 
desk-based research into the regulatory context of the two countries and the findings of our 
pilot study which identified that the Pension Funds Act in South Africa, and the Companies 
Law and Resolution 3792 in Brazil, specifically include provisions regarding shareholder 
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activism or ESG issues into investment, we decided to ask the interviewees about their 
perceptions of the influence of these particular regulations (see Appendix 1).  
  All the participants were interviewed in the country’s official language (Portuguese in Brazil 
and English in South Africa). On average, the interviews lasted 45 minutes. All of the 
interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed, except for when the interviewees did 
not allow the recording (two cases), in which case extensive notes were taken.  
 
Data analysis 
 
Thematic analysis, which is a “method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns 
(themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke 2006: 79), was used to examine the data as it provides 
a flexible tool with which to analyse qualitative data in a rich, detailed and complex manner. 
The interviews were coded in the language in which they were conducted so as not to lose the 
meaning in translation. The themes were selected based on a combination of deductive and 
“inductive” processes. While some of the themes draw from key constructs identified in the 
literature (deductive approach), others are linked to the data themselves (inductive approach). 
We coded the transcripts in an iterative process with refinements of the coding categories 
agreed after each round of coding. The final analysis reflects the agreed coding of the co-
authors. In the first step of the analysis, the transcripts were coded according to whether they 
argued for or against regulation encouraging engagement behaviour. Second, they were 
coded according to the piece of legislation to which the passages referred. Third, the extracts 
were classified according to type of influence on engagement (direct or indirect) and, finally, 
they were coded according to their effect on shareholder engagement behaviour. The 
distinction between direct and indirect is based on the definition and classification of 
shareholder engagement (Goodman et al., 2014; PRI, 2015b; USSIF, 2015). Factors were 
considered to have a direct impact when they specifically affected shareholder engagement 
behaviour on ESG issues, while factors were considered to have an indirect influence when 
they impacted whether and how investors incorporated or considered ESG issues into their 
investment processes and decision-making in general. A total of 119 passages were coded.  
 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
To investigate whether regulation influences private shareholder engagement in Brazil and 
South Africa, the interviewees from these two countries were asked whether they believe that 
legislation encourages shareholder engagement behaviour in their countries.  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
  As shown in Table 2, nearly 64% of the interviewees (75% of the South African and 50% of 
the Brazilian interviewees) reported that they believe that legislation encourages engagement 
behaviour directly and/or indirectly, or that legislation both encourages and limits shareholder 
engagement. In terms of level of positive encouragement, 9% of the interviewees (over 8% of 
South African and 10% of Brazilian interviewees) argue that local legislation encourages 
engagement directly, while 52% in the interviewees (62.5% of South African and 40% of 
Brazilian interviewees) believe that legislation encourages shareholder engagement indirectly 
by incentivising Responsible Investment more broadly. The importance of the indirect 
impact, as distinguished from the direct impact, was specifically emphasized by some 
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interviewees, as exemplified by quotations such as “I think that it [Resolution 3792] draws 
attention, but it was not mandatory” or “even though it [Regulation 28] is not very strongly 
put [i.e. Responsible Investing is not mandatory], it does go a long way to illustrate that there 
is support for the notion that underpin Responsible Investing from the regulator”. Hence the 
findings suggest that legislation provides indirect encouragement to engagement behaviour. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
  The interviews also investigated the reasons for why the interviewees believe that legislation 
encourages engagement behaviour. The arguments are summarised in Table 3. The reasons 
raised by the interviewees are discussed in greater detail below. Table 4 provides selected 
interviewee quotations. 
 
Direct positive influence of legislation 
 
Four interviewees claimed that direct encouragement to engagement behaviour occurs 
through requiring South African pension funds to invest the major part of their assets 
domestically and through protecting the rights of Brazilian minority shareholders. 
  In South Africa, two out of 24 interviewees argued that legislation encourages engagement 
directly in South Africa by requiring local pension funds to invest the majority of their assets 
locally. One of the interviewees explained that the bulk of the pension fund investments must 
be invested domestically since the Pension Funds Act limits the exposure that a South 
African pension fund may have to international investments. This interviewee then argued 
that the reason for why this regulation encourages shareholder engagement is related to the 
limited investment universe in South Africa. By investing domestically, a pension fund would 
be able to invest in a range of 150 to 200 JSE listed companies, which is a smaller investment 
universe than that of an American or European pension fund which would invest in nearly 
300 companies (Quotes 1 and 2, Table 4). Therefore, as argued by another interviewee, given 
the restricted number of investee companies in South Africa, it is more beneficial for pension 
funds to engage in discussion with the investee companies to encourage changes in ESG 
behaviour rather than divest.   
  In Brazil, two out of 20 interviewees argued that legislation encourages engagement 
directly, claiming that the Brazilian Companies Law encourages engagement by minority 
shareholders through protecting their rights. One of the interviewees noted that the 
Companies Law offers specific instruments to protect minority investors since they are in an 
unfavourable position in the Brazilian environment where voting shares are often in the hands 
of controlling shareholders (Quotes 3 and 4, Table 4), which in turn provides greater 
bargaining power to minority investors who engage in private engagements.  
 
“The Brazilian law considers minority investors weak. Weak and unprotected.” “So, 
to redress [this situation], the [Companies] law offered [minority shareholders] the 
election of the Fiscal Council, the election of minority representatives to the Board of 
Directors. You also have the multiple voting system which is also something to help 
minority investors.” (Brazilian Non-Investor) 
 
As noted in the ‘Research Context’ section, this interviewee referred to the mechanisms 
facilitating minority shareholders who hold over a certain share threshold to elect 
representatives onto Boards and Fiscal Councils of investee companies and to call for 
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cumulative voting. She argued that investor representatives are the means through whom 
minority shareholders participate in meetings with the company’s management and influence 
the decision-making process. One small Brazilian Asset Management firm interviewed 
considered the election of minority representatives their most effective engagement strategy 
to promote better governance practices among investee companies. She mentioned that her 
organisation had recently participated in a collaborative engagement with other asset 
managers representing 20% of the market capitalisation of a Brazilian listed company and 
had succeeded in electing a number of members onto the company’s Board of Directors. 
Another two Brazilian interviewees cited their involvement with a collaborative engagement 
initiative at the Association of Capital Markets’ Investors to elect a member of the Board to 
represent minority shareholders at Petrobras. These examples show that Brazilian investors 
collaborate with other minority shareholders and actively use the available legal mechanisms 
to elect Board representatives.  
  Nonetheless, while several interviewees provided tangible examples of the direct influence 
of legislation, the empirical support for a direct influence of legislation was relatively limited. 
In contrast, there was strong support for an indirect influence. 
 
Indirect positive influence of legislation 
 
The research findings strongly suggest that legislation provides an indirect encouragement to 
shareholder engagement behaviour. According to 52% of the interviewees, legislation 
encourages Responsible Investment more broadly, thereby creating an enabling environment 
for engagement. Indirect encouragement occurs specifically through raising investors’ 
awareness of Responsible Investment (both in Brazil and South Africa), increasing the 
interest of pension funds and asset consultants in the Responsible Investment practices of 
asset managers (in South Africa only), and reducing the fear of pension funds of violating 
their fiduciary duties with respect to incorporating ESG issues (both in Brazil and South 
Africa). Each of these arguments is discussed below. 
 
  Increased awareness of Responsible Investment. Nearly 39% of interviewees (42% in 
South Africa and 35% in Brazil) believe that legislation contributes to improving the level of 
understanding of investors on Responsible Investment issues. 
  In South Africa, the interviewees claimed that the level of awareness of Responsible 
Investment was raised by the recently-amended preamble of Regulation 28 of the Pension 
Funds Act. One South African Pension Fund argued that the South African market started 
speaking more explicitly about Responsible Investment since the amendment of the 
Regulation: 
 
“I think Regulation 28 (...) has got the South African market talking a lot more openly 
about Responsible Investment. Previously, it was really just the few PRI signatories 
and maybe a handful of PRI non-signatory investors.” (South African Pension Fund) 
 
  One South African Asset Manager agreed that there appears to be more conversations about 
Responsible Investment among investors and that the regulation has significantly helped to 
clarify what Responsible Investment is (Quote 6, Table 4). Moreover, three other South 
African interviewees observed that pension funds are now in the process of understanding the 
requirements of the legislation and of evaluating how they can comply with the law, while 
one South African Asset Manager noted that consultants and asset managers are also trying to 
understand Responsible Investment more broadly to serve their clients. 
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  In Brazil, the interviewees claimed that Resolution 3792 improved the level of 
understanding of Responsible Investment. One Brazilian Pension Fund noted that, even 
though this resolution approaches the issue in a broad manner and does not require pension 
funds to incorporate social and environmental aspects in their investment decisions, 
legislation has encouraged pension funds to pay attention to and be interested in the theme 
(Quote 8, Table 4). Similarly, one Brazilian Non-Investor claimed that, because the 
regulation makes it mandatory for pension funds to consider these issues in their investment 
policies, the executives of the pension funds are required to discuss the topic at some point in 
order to rewrite their investment policies, which increases awareness (Quote 9, Table 4). 
  Another Brazilian Non-Investor argued that legislation had a more focused impact, affecting 
largely the Brazilian PRI signatories. This interviewee posited that the Brazilian PRI 
signatories understood the resolution issuance as a sign that the inclusion of social and 
environmental issues in the investment decisions of the pension funds would become 
mandatory in the future. As a consequence, the PRI signatories decided to create a new 
working group within the PRI Brazil Network, the Investment Policy Working Group, to 
assist pension funds to write their Responsible Investment policies. Consistent with the 
expectations of the PRI signatories, two Brazilian interviewees mentioned that the Secretary 
for Complementary Pension Fund Policies (SPPC) is in the process of revaluating the 
resolution and assessing whether it should make the inclusion of social and environmental 
aspects mandatory in investment policies of pension funds.   
  Overall, the findings strongly suggest that Regulation 28 in South Africa and Resolution 
3792 in Brazil have improved the level of understanding of Responsible Investment issues. 
 
  Increase of pension fund and asset consultant interest in the asset managers’ 
Responsible Investment practices. Approximately 21% of the South African interviewees, 
representing 56% of all South African asset managers interviewed, noted that Regulation 28 
has also encouraged pension funds and asset consultants to start asking current and potential 
asset managers about their Responsible Investment practices. 
  One South African Asset Manager noted that there has been an increase in the number of 
questions that they receive from asset consultancies and questions in Request for Proposals 
(RfPs) on how they apply Regulation 28.  
 
“I think, from my perspective, a lot more questions from asset consultancies, certainly 
a lot more queries around how you apply Regulation 28, questions in RFPs, request 
for proposals, you know...” (South African Asset Manager) 
 
Another South African Asset Manager mentioned that they have been receiving 
questionnaires from asset owners inquiring about their approach to Responsible Investment 
and about how they apply Regulation 28 to their investment processes (Quote 13, Table 4). A 
third Asset Manager observed that their clients have been asking them questions to examine 
how aware they are of Responsible Investment issues. Despite the increase in the level of 
interest of pension funds and asset consultants, three of the asset managers interviewed noted 
that the quality of the questions by the pension funds is still rather poor (see Quote 15, Table 
4).  
  The interviewees highlighted that the level of knowledge of pension fund trustees is not only 
low on ESG issues, but also on investment and finance more broadly. According to one Asset 
Manager, the level of investment knowledge of many pension fund trustees is low because 
they do not come from an asset management or financial services background. Another Asset 
Manager claimed that, in a board of trustees, there might be two or three individuals who 
fully understand investments, while others might not, especially those trustees who represent 
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employees - according to article 7A of the Pension Funds Act, pension members have the 
right to elect at least 50% of the pension fund board members. A Non-Investor highlighted 
that employee trustees are usually shop stewards that are voted by their work colleagues to sit 
on the board of the pension funds and often have a low level of educational skills (Quote 16, 
Table 4). She observed that, as trustees are not knowledgeable in investment skills, they take 
advice from asset consultants, actuaries and asset managers (Quote 17, Table 4). Another 
Non-Investor argued that, as pension funds tend not to be financial experts, they delegate 
their authority to the asset managers who will provide them with expert information. 
  Hence, the South African interviewees perceived that there has been an increase in the level 
of interest of pension funds in Responsible Investment issues, as observed by their service 
providers, even though the nature of the enquiries has been quite superficial and not yet 
translated into real implementation. 
 
  Pension funds less wary of violating their fiduciary duties. Nearly 16% of interviewees 
(25% in South Africa, 5% in Brazil) argued that legislation makes pension funds less wary of 
violating their fiduciary duties when incorporating ESG issues in their investment processes. 
  The South African interviewees claimed that the preamble of Regulation 28 of the Pension 
Funds Act creates a fiduciary duty to pension fund trustees to at least consider ESG issues in 
their investment decisions.  
 
“…Regulation 28 has made a requirement for all pension funds under the Pension 
Funds Act of South Africa to at least consider any issues including ESG issues that 
will materially impact on the long-term financial performance of any investment. So it 
is now within the fiduciary responsibility of the pension fund trustee to have at least 
considered these things…” (South African Pension Fund) 
 
One South African Non-Investor noted that, prior to the amendment of Regulation 28, 
pension fund trustees perceived that the incorporation of ESG issues was not in line with their 
fiduciary duties as they believed that ESG integration compromised financial returns (Quote 
20, Table 4). However, the interviewees argued that Regulation 28 now expands the fiduciary 
duties of pension fund trustees to include the consideration of ESG issues. 
  Likewise, in Brazil, one pension fund argued that, before Resolution 3792 was issued, 
pension funds were concerned that the inclusion of social/environmental issues in investment 
decisions could be perceived as against their fiduciary duties. However, the Pension Fund 
claimed that, after these issues were incorporated in the law, pension funds interpreted the 
regulation as a message from the government that the inclusion of social and environmental 
factors into investment processes is considered good practice (Quote 24, Table 4). Therefore, 
legislation in both countries contributed to making pension funds less worried about 
breaching their fiduciary duties by incorporating ESG issues in their investment decisions. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, we analysed to what extent regulations influence private shareholder 
engagement attitudes and behaviour of pension funds and asset managers with listed 
companies in Brazil and South Africa, in particular, we investigated the role of the Pension 
Funds Act in South Africa and the Companies Law and Resolution 3792 in Brazil. Drawing 
on 44 in-depth semi-structured interviews with pension fund representatives, asset managers 
and other investment players, the research findings suggest that legislation provides limited 
direct encouragement to private engagement attitudes and behaviour. However, legislation 
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encourages attitudes towards Responsible Investment by enhancing investor understanding of 
Responsible Investment, increasing the interest of pension funds and asset consultants in the 
Responsible Investment practices of asset managers, and reducing the fear of pension funds 
to violate their fiduciary duties, thereby promoting an enabling environment for engagement.  
  Interviewees suggested that Regulation 28 in South Africa and Resolution 3792 in Brazil 
respectively increased the level of awareness of Responsible Investment within pension 
funds. Even though both pieces of legislation do not explicitly demand pension funds to 
include ESG issues in their investment decisions, the interviewees perceived that they helped 
to bring the discussion about Responsible Investment to the forefront of the pension industry. 
Similar laws to the Brazilian regulation requiring pension funds to disclose how social and 
environmental information is processed in the construction of investment portfolios exist in 
the UK, Belgium, France, Netherlands and Germany (See, 2009). Mathieu (2000) highlights 
the impact of the disclosure legislation in the UK, noting that over half of the pension funds 
incorporated ESG factors into their investment decisions shortly after the regulation was 
introduced, while Bengtsson (2008) argues that legislation was largely responsible for the rise 
of Responsible Investment among state-controlled pension funds in Scandinavia. Solomon 
(2010) defends the idea that these types of disclosure requirements for pension funds act as 
incentives for trustees to adopt such policies because they would probably be embarrassed to 
state in their investment policy that they do not have any type of Responsible Investment 
concern. Moreover, there is an understanding among some interviewees that the Brazilian 
regulation might change in the future and that investors must be prepared for potential further 
regulation, creating an additional incentive for investors to act. Hence this study suggests that 
regulation in both countries enhances investor understanding of Responsible Investment. 
  Another indirect impact on engagement relates to the inclusion of ESG issues in Regulation 
28 in South Africa and in Resolution 3792 in Brazil. The research findings indicate that, by 
incorporating ESG issues, legislation rendered pension funds less concerned about breaching 
their fiduciary duties, duties which require trustees to manage funds in the best interest of the 
underlying owners or ultimate recipients of the funds (Sandberg, 2011). The literature on 
Responsible Investment discusses at length the fact that pension funds are fearful of acting 
against their fiduciary duties (e.g. Hawley & Williams, 2006; Hoepner, Rezec & Siegl, 2011; 
Richardson, 2011; Sandberg, 2011) as pension funds often interpret fiduciary duties as 
prohibiting consideration of any factor other than those directly related to maximising 
shareholder wealth (Hawley & Williams, 2006). Nonetheless, as noted earlier, some 
jurisdictions such as Manitoba in Canada, Illinois in the US, and the UK expressly allow 
trustees to take ESG considerations into account provided that their duties of prudence are 
met (Richardson, 2008). In Illinois, the Illinois Pension Code was amended in 2005 to 
prohibit state investment in Sudan and companies doing business with or in Sudan (Dhooge, 
2006). In the UK, the UK Law Commission’s Guidance to Pension Fund Trustees (Law 
Commission, 2014) recommends to trustees that non-financial factors may be taken into 
account if trustees have good reason to think that scheme members would share the concern 
and if the decision does not involve a risk of significant financial detriment to the fund - a 
similar approach to the one suggested by the ‘Freshfields Report’. Likewise, in Brazil and 
South Africa, the interviewees reported that, after the inclusion of ESG issues in the 
legislation, either by requiring pension funds to consider ESG issues or to disclose the level 
of ESG considerations in their investment policies, institutional investors are less concerned 
about breaching their fiduciary duties towards their beneficiaries, increasing the incentives 
for Responsible Investment adoption. 
  Further, the interviewees reported that the inclusion of ESG issues into legislation increased 
the level of interest of South African pension funds in the Responsible Investment practices 
of asset managers. Nevertheless, the interviewees recognised that the quality of the questions 
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of pension funds is still rather superficial and not yet translated into effective implementation. 
The interviewees also posited that not only are South African trustees not knowledgeable 
about Responsible Investment issues, but they also lack an understanding of investment 
issues more broadly due to the professional background of most South African trustees, 
especially those nominated by the employees. The lack of trustee investment skills and 
expertise seems to be an issue in developed countries as well (Clark, 2004; Clark & Urwin, 
2008; Kakabadse et al., 2003; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2005; Monks & Minow 2011; 
Myners, 2001). In the US, Monks and Minow (2011) state that, as trustees of public pension 
funds may be composed by diverse members such as employees, retirees and political 
appointees, their expertise may lie in other areas than investment. Similarly, in the UK, 
Myners (2001) and Kakabadse et al. (2003) observe that neither do British trustees have 
professional qualification in finance nor are they properly trained to take office. Solomon 
(2010) and Tilba and McNulty (2013) add that, as most UK pension fund trustees lack 
investment expertise, they often rely on the expertise of external service providers such as 
actuaries, investment consultants and investment fund managers, deferring to them strategic 
asset allocation decisions. Our interviews support the literature, indicating that the lack of 
trustee knowledge is not restricted to developed countries and to investment issues, but it 
extends to emerging markets and to ESG issues. As a result of their low level of expertise, 
South African pension fund trustees transfer their Responsible Investment responsibilities 
onto their asset managers which, at this moment, is occurring through trying to understand 
their Responsible Investment practices further. Hence, the research findings and the literature 
suggest that, in both developed and emerging countries, pension fund trustees lack investment 
knowledge and, in one sense, shift their responsibilities to their service providers. 
  In general, this study strongly suggests that legislation can encourage shareholder 
engagement in at least some of the more developed emerging markets such as Brazil and 
South Africa, even though this finding may not be representative of all emerging markets. 
While previous scholarship argued that the legal environment in developing and emerging 
markets is characterised by a lack of regulations encouraging responsible behaviour (e.g. 
Ozen & Kusku, 2009; Rahim & Alam, 2014), or that ESG-related regulations in these 
countries are unsophisticated and ineffective (e.g. Estrin & Prevezer, 2011; Mordi, Opeyemi, 
Tonbara & Ojo, 2012), our research findings indicate that Brazil and South Africa feature 
characteristics more similar to developed countries in terms of the sophistication of the 
legislation on ESG issues directed at investors. Emphasis on governance, environmental and 
social issues by the governments of both countries – as reflected by broad-based development 
legislation in South Africa (such as the Employment Equity Act and the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment) (West, 2006) and by laws protecting minority investor rights and 
strict environmental regulations in Brazil (SustainAbility, 2006) – is possibly the reason as to 
why ESG issues were incorporated into pension fund legislation. Since this study found that 
Brazil and South Africa have ESG legislation in place encouraging responsible investor 
behaviour, our findings contradict the literature which purports that there are significant 
differences in corporate behaviour between common and civil law countries (e.g. Grosvold & 
Brammer, 2011; La Porta et al., 1998; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Rather, this paper indicates 
that, instead of examining the effect of national institutional configurations (e.g. Anglo-
American versus Continental European systems; common versus civil legal systems), it may 
be more fruitful to disaggregate these arrangements and examine the influence of institutional 
variables on corporate governance practices and responsible behaviour, as argued by some 
researchers (e.g. Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Fransen, 2013; Heugens & Otten, 2007). 
  This paper also highlights the need for a more fine-grained examination of emerging 
markets in order to better understand how institutional frameworks in different countries 
influence corporate governance practices. The literature has treated emerging markets in a 
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homogenous manner (cf. Aaronson, 2005; Ozen & Kusku, 2009; Rahim & Alam, 2014; 
Yoshikawa, Zhu & Wang, 2014), often considering their formal institutional arrangements 
such as legislation and legal enforcement as underdeveloped or non-existent. As argued by 
Hah and Freeman (2014), given the differences between Asian emerging economies in terms 
of political and legal systems and cultural norms, research findings in the Asian region cannot 
be generalised to the whole of Asia. Likewise, this study indicates that within emerging 
markets there are significant institutional differences which must be taken into consideration 
in corporate governance studies for a better analysis of governance practices in these nations. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study strongly suggests that legislation encourages shareholder engagement indirectly by 
encouraging Responsible Investment more broadly. By studying the impact of regulation on 
shareholder engagement in emerging markets, this study makes a number of academic and 
practical contributions.  
  Firstly, this research contributes to the academic literature related to private investor 
engagement, particularly in emerging markets. Even though the adoption of shareholder 
engagement by institutional investors is increasing worldwide (PRI, 2011), the amount of 
literature on the topic is limited, particularly on private engagement strategies, given issues 
related to data access (Amalric, 2004; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Rehbein et al., 2013). 
Moreover, as Gifford argues (2008: 256), “there needs to be exploration of the shareholder 
engagement context across different jurisdictions and cultural differences”. The existing 
academic studies tend to concentrate on studying engagement practices in the UK and the US 
(e.g. Clark & Hebb, 2004; Gifford, 2010) while less effort has been put into analysing 
engagement outside these two Anglo-Saxon contexts (Bauer et al., 2013; Sjöström, 2008). To 
our knowledge, only three academic studies (Choi & Cho, 2003; Chow, 2010; Gond & Piani, 
2013) study private engagement in emerging markets. Therefore, the present study helps to 
fill a substantial gap in the literature with regard to this particular area of research. 
  Secondly, this research contributes to scholarship applying the institutional perspective as a 
useful lens through which to analyse shareholder engagement in developing/emerging 
countries. While institutional theory has been applied to research corporate governance 
widely (e.g. Bauwhede & Willekens; 2008; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Heugens & Otten, 
2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008), to our knowledge, the institutional perspective has scarcely 
been used to analyse shareholder engagement in emerging markets (except for Adegbite, 
Amaeshi & Amao, 2012), while, to our knowledge, this is the first piece of research using 
institutional theory to specifically investigate more private forms of shareholder engagement. 
Prior research from an institutional perspective has put much emphasis on coercive 
isomorphism pressures with regards to government policies on Responsible Investment. As 
one recent study noted, “policies addressing issues with a more economic focus such as 
socially responsible investing (SRI) and fair trade are addressed through partnering type 
policies (fair trade) and mandating (SRI)” (Knudsen et al., 2015: 93), inter alia pointing to a 
number of European countries (including France, Belgium and Britain) where the 
government passed legislation stipulating reporting requirements for public pension funds. 
However, the present research points to the importance of the normative isomorphism 
function of government legislation in terms of endorsing and facilitating (rather than 
mandating) changes in investor behaviour on social and environmental issues through 
influencing the basis of the discourse among investors on ESG issues and these normative 
indirect pressures appear to be more effective in changing investor behaviour than perhaps 
previously anticipated in the literature. At the same time, this paper highlights the need to 
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disaggregate corporate governance institutional arrangements into individual variables to 
more accurately examine the influence of the institutional environment on governance 
practices. 
  In wider terms, this study responds to a call made recently in this journal for research that 
investigates “governance phenomena in relatively unexplored countries and/or in cross-
country research projects taking into account the institutional forces developed at the national 
level” (Kumar & Zattoni, 2015: 1) and to a call for more qualitative research to “generate 
fresh new theoretical insights about corporate governance practices that are both rigorous and 
relevant” (Zattoni, Douglas & Judge, 2013: 119). According to a review by McNulty, Zattoni 
& Douglas (2013), only a small fraction of governance studies adopt qualitative methods, 
with the majority investigating issues related to boards of directors such as non-executive 
directors and board committees, often in the British setting, while considerably less research 
has focused on issues related to investors and shareholders, and on non-European contexts. 
Hence this study contributes to filling a gap in the qualitative governance research by 
carrying out a comparative analysis of governance practices of two emerging markets.  
  As for practical contributions, this study draws investors’ attention to the importance of a 
thorough understanding of the local legal environment of the companies with which they 
engage. For example, this research indicates how the combination of regulation limiting 
foreign investment from South African pension funds and the restricted investment universe 
increases the importance of the engagement strategy for local investors. It also identifies and 
discusses the legal mechanisms that are available to minority shareholders in Brazil willing to 
engage with investee companies as an insider in the Boards of Directors. Further, it shows 
how the incorporation of ESG issues into national legislation contributed towards redefining 
the concept of fiduciary duties for pension funds. 
  This research finally offers insights to governments interested in fostering engagement 
practices in their countries. Given that this study found a positive indirect influence of 
legislation on the level of engagement, governments from other countries could also consider 
developing ESG-related regulations for pension funds to reduce trustee fear of violating their 
fiduciary duties and to encourage investors to adopt more Responsible Investment practices, 
without the need to prescribe specific mandatory investment policies. 
  Like any other study, the present study has a number of limitations. First, given our finding 
that the level of sophistication of the legislation in Brazil and South Africa is more similar to 
that of developed countries than other emerging markets, it may not be possible to generalise 
the research findings to all emerging markets. Second, the interview sample is largely 
comprised of PRI signatories as priority was given to interviewees who value Responsible 
Investment practices, hence this study cannot claim to be representative of all institutional 
investors in Brazil and South Africa. Third, by interviewing investors who value Responsible 
Investment practices, this study focused on identifying the factors that encourage shareholder 
engagement rather than factors that may discourage shareholder engagement in these nations. 
Nonetheless, this research study clearly addresses a gap in the current literature and it 
provides rich empirical insights from two leading emerging markets. 
 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Our study provides a much needed window for understanding shareholder engagement in 
Brazil and South Africa, but future research would benefit from follow-up studies. At the 
time of the interviews, some changes to the institutional contexts were taking place, and, 
according to the interviewees, the full effects of these changes had not yet been felt. In South 
Africa, it is still uncertain what the full effects of Regulation 28 may be. In Brazil, a possible 
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amendment to Law 3792 is unconfirmed thus far. Moreover, in April 2014, the Brazilian 
Central Bank issued Resolution 4327, requiring that financial institutions establish and 
implement a policy of social and environmental responsibility (Banco Central do Brasil, 
2014), creating an additional driver for financial institutions to incorporate ESG issues in 
Brazil. Follow-up work would particularly benefit from longitudinal studies to investigate 
how institutional influences as well as the attitudes of investors and non-investors towards 
shareholder engagement and Responsible Investment change over time.  
  While we cannot generalise the research findings to all emerging markets, our results may 
be of considerable relevance for those emerging markets with significant assets employing 
Responsible Investment strategies such as South Korea and Malaysia (ASrIA, 2014) and, in 
particular, emerging markets whose regulatory institutions incentivise investor responsible 
behaviour, as it is notably the case of the Mexican Pension Fund regulator (CONSAR) that 
recommends for pension fund administrators to disclose whether investee companies have 
social responsibility certifications (Montes, 2015). Therefore, this study highlights the need 
for research on shareholder engagement in emerging markets that disaggregates corporate 
governance institutional arrangements into individual variables to reach a more fine-grained 
perspective on these nations. Given that there are significant institutional differences within 
emerging markets, future studies examining institutional variables individually would be 
more useful to investigate how the institutional context encourages or curbs shareholder 
engagement in these nations. 
  Our main finding that rising legislation encourages shareholder engagement and 
Responsible Investment in some emerging economies stands in contrast to the widespread 
anxiomatic assumption in the Political CSR literature that national governments are 
progressively losing the power to regulate the private sector in a globalized economy (e.g. 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Mäkinen & Kourula, 2012; cf. Frynas & Stephens, 2015) and, in 
particular, that emerging and developing economies either lack sophisticated social and 
environmental regulation or are unable to effectively enforce regulation (e.g. Dentchev et al., 
2015; Tan, 2009). Our findings are even more significant given that regulation impacted 
investor behaviour through normative – rather than coercive – isomorphism channels, falling 
in line with wider scholarship in sociology which suggests that governments employ 
signalling processes in order to shape norms and standards for organizations to follow, 
without the need for mandatory regulation (e.g. Dobbin & Sutton, 1998; Edelman, 1992). We 
hope that – in a modest fashion – our study will serve to stimulate more research into the role 
of formal institutions in influencing shareholder engagement and Responsible Investment in 
emerging and developing markets, and – in wider terms – will help towards a re-assessment 
of the role and potential of formal social and environmental regulations in emerging and 
developing markets. 
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TABLE 1 
List of participants 
 
Type of interviewee Brazil South Africa 
Investors 
13 investors: 
 6 asset owners/pension funds 
 7 asset managers 
12 investors: 
 3 asset owners/pension funds 
 9 asset managers 
Non-investors 
7 non-investors: 
 1 academic 
 1 industry association 
 5 investor associations 
12 non-investors: 
 2 academics 
 1 industry association 
 4 investor associations 
 4 investment consultants 
 1 independent activist 
Total number of interviewees 20 24 
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TABLE 2 
Interviewees’ Perceptions on the Influence of Legislation on Shareholder Engagement 
Interviewees claimed that: 
South Africa Brazil Total 
n % n % n % 
Legislation encourages shareholder engagement 15 62.5% 10 50% 25 56.8% 
Directly only 0 0 2 10% 2 4.5% 
Indirectly only 13 54.2% 8 40% 21 47.7% 
Directly and indirectly 2 8.3% 0 0 2 4.5 % 
Legislation both encourages and limits shareholder 
engagement 
3 12.5% 0 0 3 6.8% 
Legislation does not influence shareholder 
engagement 
3 12.5% 5 25% 8 18.2% 
Did not respond, did not have an opinion or were 
not asked the question (when they were not actively 
involved with the investment community) 
6 25% 5 25% 11 25% 
TOTAL 24 100% 20 100% 44 100% 
Total value is over 100% because some interviewees were categorised into more than one alternative. 
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TABLE 3 
Interviewees’ Reasons for why Legislation Encourages Shareholder Engagement 
Interviewees claimed: 
South Africa Brazil Total 
n % n % n % 
Direct positive impact 
Limited investment universe 2 8.3% 0 0 2 4.5% 
Protection to minority shareholders 0 0 2 10% 2 4.5% 
Indirect positive impact 
Increased awareness of Responsible Investment 10 41.7% 7 35% 17 38.6% 
Increase of pension fund and asset consultant interest in 
the asset managers’ Responsible Investment practices 
5 20.8% 0 0 5 11.4% 
Pension fund less wary of violating their fiduciary duties 6 25% 1 5% 7 15.9% 
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TABLE 4 
Interviewees’ Reasons for why Legislation Encourages Shareholder Engagement – Selected interviewee quotations 
Representative quotations supporting direct impact of legislation 
Quote 1. “There is a small investment universe in South Africa, so it is possible to engage with companies, so it is not like some of your, you 
know, US or European or UK pension funds that have got investments from 300 companies, in the South African context, you are looking at 
about 150 to 200 companies maximum that are companies that the pension fund would be invested in. And in most instances, it is focused on the 
top 100 listed companies in the JSE, certainly for the listed portfolio and so they would need to engage with pro-performers within that top 100 
universe.” (South African Pension Fund) 
Quote 2. “…the South African market is quite a small concentrated market, so the investment universe is quite small and the reason for that is 
we have Pension Fund regulation [the Pension Funds Act] which limited the exposure that a pension fund may have to international 
investments. So South Africa wasn’t as badly affected by the financial crisis because we had limited exposure to international markets. The bulk 
of our investments had to be within South Africa, so investment managers in a sense, because there is a limited number of possible investments 
on the JSE, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, specifically for listed equities, your investment universe is quite small.” (South African Pension 
Fund) 
Quote 3. “The Brazilian law considers minority investors weak. Weak and unprotected. Hence, it [the law] has established a few 
instruments...which is true because you have the shareholder, you have voting shares that are normally in the hands of the controlling 
shareholder, and you have preferential shares that do not have the right to vote. So, to redress [this situation], the [Companies] law offered 
[minority shareholders] the election of the Fiscal Council, the election of minority representatives to the Board of Directors. You also have the 
multiple voting system which is also something to help minority investors.” (Brazilian Non-Investor) 
Quote 4: “It [the Companies Law] allows that preferential shareholders with 10% of the company elect a Board member representing minority 
investors, or shareholders with 15% of the voting shares. In this case, if you have a shareholder with 15% of the capital, s/he can elect...s/he can 
say at the AGM ‘I will elect’.” (Brazilian Non-Investor) 
Representative quotations supporting indirect impact of legislation 
On increased awareness of responsible investment 
Quote 5. “I think Regulation 28 and CRISA has got the South African market talking a lot more openly about Responsible Investment. 
Previously, it was really just the few PRI signatories and maybe a handful of PRI non-signatory investors, so that could be pension funds and 
asset managers that were talking about sustainability issues.” (South African Pension Fund) 
Quote 6. “In terms of awareness, there appears to be many more conversations about Responsible Investment and it’s probably driven mostly by 
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Regulation 28 rather than CRISA [Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa]. CRISA is guidance, but Regulation 28 is regulation and it 
appears that Regulation 28 has ensures the interest of the asset owners, so all of a sudden now, there seems to be a big focus on Responsible 
Investment.” (South African Asset Manager) 
Quote 7. “So I would say they’ve both [Regulation 28 and the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa] been very important in terms of 
putting the dialogue on the map, you know.” (South African Asset Manager) 
Quote 8. “Today, the law [Resolution 3792] is too broad. And, even though it is broad, pension funds have already started being interested and 
paying attention to...” (Brazilian Pension Fund) 
Quote 9. “…because when you write your investment policy, this topic has to be there. So, eventually, that went through a discussion with the 
management of the small pension funds. It is a start.” (Brazilian Non-Investor) 
Quote 10. “Absolutely. [Since Resolution 3792 was issued] no pension fund wants to allege that it does not address the issue or that it does not 
consider the subject relevant. Hence, pension funds were concerned about learning about the topic and about making progress in relation to 
ESG issues.” (Brazilian Pension Fund) 
Quote 11. “I think that it [Resolution 3792] draws attention, but it was not mandatory ‘now you have to invest’, not least because that was 
perhaps too difficult to be made, but it certainly drew attention ‘maybe this is something that I, pension fund, also have to pay attention to.’” 
(Brazilian Non-Investor) 
On increased interest in responsible investment 
Quote 12. “I think, from my perspective, a lot more questions from asset consultancies, certainly a lot more queries around how you apply 
Regulation 28, questions in RFPs, request for proposals, you know...” (South African Asset Manager) 
Quote 13. “So then a lot of questions, so they are coming. So asset owners would send questionnaires about what you consider Responsible 
Investment to be, how are you responding to CRISA, Regulation 28, how your investment processes are changing as a result of that.” (South 
African Asset Manager) 
Quote 14. “…when Regulation 28 says that we need to now specifically consider these ESG factors, we suddenly started getting questions. But it 
wasn't in-depth questions. It was question like “what are you guys doing around the ESG issues?” and then really your answer can be 
anything.” (South African Asset Manager) 
Quote 15. “I would argue that the quality of the questions is often quite bad, people don’t really know what they are asking, so they didn’t really 
know whether they were looking at a horse or a donkey, you know what I mean? They just have no idea.” (South African Asset Manager) 
Quote 16. “So it’s right this point that many of the trustees are poorly educated in financial matters, especially if it’s an occupational fund, 
especially on the employees’ side. There might be shop stewards that are voted by their work colleagues to sit on the board of the pension funds. 
They probably have quite a low educational skills level as it is, then they come into a quite overwhelming environment of now sitting and become 
financial managers or trustees of this fund.” (South African Non-Investor) 
Quote 17. “...they are not strongly empowered, the trustees in South Africa are not typically very strong in a lot of skills and expertise in 
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investment. They will take a lot of their guidance from the investment consultants and actuaries and then they will take a lot of guidance from the 
asset managers and they will just expect them to take care of this for the fund.” (South African Non-Investor) 
On decreased concern of violating fiduciary duties 
Quote 18. “…Regulation 28 has made a requirement for all pension funds under the Pension Funds Act of South Africa to at least consider any 
issues including ESG issues that will materially impact on the long-term financial performance of any investment. So it is now within the 
fiduciary responsibility of the pension fund trustee to have at least considered these things…” (South African Pension Fund) 
Quote 19. “Because in the past, I mean, this we’ve experienced this because we’ve been in this longer than the revise of Regulation 28, in some 
people’s minds there has been that debate that says ‘I would not be sacrificing my fiduciary duty’ because everybody has been thinking that I 
have to provide returns and that’s it. So the change to 28 provides, at least, recognition which is what we’ve been saying anyway for a long time 
that sustainability of a pension fund is not – or at least the financial return is not narrowly related to the numbers.” (South African Pension 
Fund) 
Quote 20. “And the understanding of fiduciary duty among trustees that you have to focus on financial return and, because there was still that 
perception that you compromise return by looking at sustainability issues, people felt it was not in line with their fiduciary duties.” (South 
African Non-Investor) 
Quote 21. “There has been changes in regulation in South Africa [Regulation 28] recently which is increasingly bringing a broader 
consideration of fiduciary issues to the fore of trustees, including environmental, social and governance factors” (South African Asset Manager) 
Quote 22. “CRISA is important, but I think that the more important change is this Regulation 28, because it is making the Principal Officers of 
the pension funds, essentially like the Chief Executive Officer of the company, the head of sort of trustees, these Principal Officers are now 
beginning to realise that many of these things that they thought perhaps they didn’t have to do, it is actually part in their fiduciary duties and 
they have to do it.” (South African Asset Manager) 
Quote 23. “That said, we’ve had a change in local legislation last year, the legislation that governs local pension funds which is the Regulation 
28 which was amended last year, early in February last year, which states that, as fiduciaries looking after pension fund assets, we should give 
consideration to all factors as part of a Responsible Investment strategy and consider ESG factors, all factors including ESG factors”. (South 
African Asset Manager) 
Quote 24. “So oftentimes in the beginning we heard that there was a lot of resistance, a concern coming from some of the pension funds, 
especially about fiduciary duty.” “Then, from the moment that (Resolution) 3792 explicitly states that investment policies must have practices, 
or, if they don’t have any, that they comment, justify, I think those concerns were minimised.” (Brazilian Pension Fund) 
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APPENDIX 1 
Interview guide to institutional investors 
 
 
Definition of shareholder engagement:  
In this study, shareholder engagement is defined as direct negotiations between investors and 
portfolio companies regarding the company’s strategic and operational matters. For the 
purposes of this research, only shareholder engagement between institutional investors and 
listed companies on environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) concerns will be 
considered. Filing resolutions and voting at Annual General Meetings will not be considered 
engagement. 
 
Main interview questions:  
 
1. Please state your position and main responsibilities. 
 
2. Please describe the state of Responsible Investment and shareholder engagement in the 
country: are institutional investors incorporating ESG issues into their investment 
decisions and engaging with investee companies on these issues? 
 
3. Which is the approach to Responsible Investment of your organisation? Is your 
organisation engaging with companies at the moment on ESG issues? 
 
4. In your opinion, what encourages shareholder engagement in South Africa? Then 
specifically raise the impact of legislation (refer to the Pension Funds Act – including 
Regulation 28 - in South Africa and the Companies Law and Resolution 3792 in Brazil) 
 
 
